Efficiency Unit scrutiny of public sector research establishments : oral and written evidence / Science and Technology Select Committee.

  • Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Select Committee on Science and Technology.
Date:
1994
Catalogue details

Licence: Open Government Licence

Credit: Efficiency Unit scrutiny of public sector research establishments : oral and written evidence / Science and Technology Select Committee. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    33/132 (page 25)
    13 October] [Continued 6on “prior options” exercises for the research councils when there are several other mechanisms already in place, including the Director General of Research Councils, for looking at their structures across the board. Recommendation 10 suggests major reorganisation where the benefits are far from clear (see below paragraphs 7.11 ff). Recommendation 12 suggests extra layers of bureaucracy which if their role is to be effectively carried out (10), will entail substantial extra overhead costs. 4.2.8. It also needs to be remembered that science for the most part is an activity which needs continuity and a long term perspective. Security of funding and freedom from constant contractual and organisational upheaval are required to enable it to flourish. In the words of the Chief Scientific Adviser: “In the implementation of the White Paper there must be no excessive unthinking zeal in the interpretation of accountability, evaluation, management, selectivity, exploitability, etc. albeit that each is important. R&D in general, and basic research in particular, is a tender flower which requires tender care and nourishment, sometimes over a long period of time” (11). 4.2.9 For example, many of the regional and global marine environmental studies require the sustained deployment of multi-disciplinary teams over long periods of time. The long-term deterioration of the environment is not a problem that will be solved in a decade or two. Already continual re-organisations, emanating from the operation of NERC’s own internal market (supporting peer- reviewed laboratory projects on a five year rolling cycle), as well as changes in ownership and location of institutes and in the structure of NERC’s headquarters administrative structure, can have a damaging effect on staff morale and lead to the loss of skilled scientists and continuity in research. The continual reshuffling of management structures is not conducive to the long-term studies essential if the quality of life is to be maintained and the United Kingdom is to exploit marine resources at sustainable levels. 4.2.10 Ofthe supplementary rationalisation mechanisms recommended by the Scrutiny we welcome the recognition in 13 and its associated paragraphs that open competition, although theoretically supposed to increase efficiency, has its limitations; its stress on the need for a strategic co-ordinated customer view (see also Q7.(ii)) to avoid wasteful competition; and its support for collaboration. We would add that in many areas there may be no realistic possibility of creating intra-United Kingdom competition. Indeed, an insistence on competitive tendering may fragment research effort, impede co-operation on information sharing and undermine the capacity of United Kingdom research to compete internationally. Research capacity once contracted-out or a bid lost to competitors is often lost forever. If the new contractor fails to deliver there may be no alternative “in-house” experts to pick up the pieces, or to bid for the contract next time round. Departments are right to proceed with caution in opening up research areas to contract and its impact both on the department and more widely needs to be carefully monitored. 4.2.11 The NERC British Geological Survey provides an interesting case in point. It conducts long- term strategic geoscience surveying and systematic monitoring linked with the establishment and maintenance of publicly accessible geoscience data bases. The private sector is not suitably constructed to undertake long-term systematic nationwide surveying and monitoring to uniform standards nor to maintain data bases within the public domain on a long-term basis. An example of what can happen when such work is privatised is available from Sweden where they privatised their national geological survey and then had to bail it out at a cost of £20 billion. Although BGS is not currently being put forward for privatisation and the Butler Committee has concluded that the core programme should remain in the public sector, there are still dangers. Core government funding is declining and piecemeal market testing by DTI and DOE has ensured that work is contracted out to separate organisations, thus endangering the national data base. 4.2.12 We also welcome recommendations 17, 18 and 20, many of which are already happening, as ways of enhancing collaboration. In our view the necessary groupings for administrative economies of scale and viability such as common pension schemes, pay and personnel systems, can be achieved through consortia, as is already happening in Scotland through the creation of the Committee of Heads of Agricultural and Biological Organisations (CHABOS). Consortia could also be devised for scientific purposes without necessarily needing to transfer ownership. Such looser linkages would enable the objectives of efficient flexible organisations responding to a changing environment and collaborating or competing as appropriate to be achieved without the upheaval of large scale reorganisation and the creation of extra bureaucratic layers between individual institutes and agencies and their “parent” department or research council. 4.2.13 We do not consider it necessary for Departments and OST to be informed in the amount of detail about the activities of the PSREs as suggested in recommendation 14. As the Scrutiny team itself says elsewhere agencies should have a higher degree of autonomy in exercising their responsibilities. It is unnecessary and wasteful for both departments and the OST to be “second guessing” every detail of management. This does not mean that PSREs should not do their own competition assessments. Although departments and particularly the OST may need to monitor broad