Social and ethical interpretations in mental development : A study in social psychology.

  • Baldwin, James Mark, 1861-1934.
Date:
1899
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Social and ethical interpretations in mental development : A study in social psychology. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The University of Leeds Library. The original may be consulted at The University of Leeds Library.

    576/608 (page 552)
    Now this theory, it seems, does not1 reconcile’ the two processes; it merely gives us an interesting account of the genesis of the opposi- tion. It seems to require, both in its account of the description of phenomena and in that of the meaning of desire, the same opposition between a unity which is merely recognized as there, and a unity which is demanded, although not there. Professor Royce leaves the desire urging on to something essentially indescribable and unverifiable. He says : “ The object of our ideal is desirable not in so far as it is describa- ble, and, again precisely in so far as it is not yet verifiable [italics his]. Herein, then, lies a double contrast between the natural fact as such, and the object of desire as such.” With this account of desire we should expect failure to get any real reconciliation; for it confuses the ‘object’ of desire with the fact that with the object there is what we call, very obscurely often, the accompanying sense of an ideal. But when we come to distinguish between the object and this ideal accom- paniment, we see that the object is both describable and verifiable;1 and then we see that through the attainment of it — if perchance we do attain it — we have brought the ideal which it stood for nearer to a similar construction. It, too, becomes now in so far also describable and verifiable, not now, however, as ideal, but as fact. The sense called ideal still goes on to attach to a further object of desire. But inasmuch as by the successful pursuit of this object, then and there, we have so far realized our ideal, in so far we have turned the ‘ ought ’ into the ‘ is1; we have made natural history out of the objects of our ethical cravings. May not this give a real reconciliation of the two points of view, rather than an account merely of the opposition which remains to plague Mr. Royce? The sense of ought, then, from my point of view, is the anticipation of more experience, not yet treated under the rubrics of description; but as far as it is identified with any object of desire, it is thought to exemplify the canons of description of that object as being most nearly the sort of experience that expectation is reaching out after. And natural science, the ‘ cosmic process,’ is the sa?ne series read back- wards. It is experience fully described, and hence rid of that colouring of expectation and desire which, when it was looked at the other way, made it the vehicle for the realization of the ideal. When we come to the metaphysical point of view we find the same criticism of Mr. Royce in order. What shall we say to a 1 reconcilia- tion ’ which still, as I think, allows the two parties to the controversy each to establish his own side by cutting off half of consciousness and 1 It is the ‘ thing of fact ’ described in Sect. 242 f.